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ABSTRACT
The 2014 election in the Western Cape was once again a high-stakes, 
fiercely-contested affair. Political parties saw the Western Cape as an ‘open 
race’ and the province became the centre of vigorous campaign efforts in 
the lead-up to the election. The African National Congress (ANC), which 
had lost control of the province because its vote share dropped from 45% 
in 2004 to 32% in 2009, hoped to unseat the Democratic Alliance (DA), 
which had won in 2009 by a very narrow margin (51%). The ANC felt 
that it had done enough to regain control of the province, especially in 
light of deep-seated disillusionment in many communities and the violent 
protests that took place prior to the election.While the ANC maintained its 
support base, winning votes from 33% of the provincial electorate, the type 
of identity-based campaign it pursued combined with other factors to work 
to the DA’s advantage. Despite the fact that the DA also engaged in race-
based campaigning it won 59% of the provincial vote. This was obtained 
at the expense of small parties, who received negligible support in the 2014 
election. Only the Economic Freedom Fighters and the African Christian 
Democratic Party won enough votes to obtain a seat each in the provincial 
legislature. This article examines electoral dynamics in the Western Cape, 
which saw the consolidation of DA support in the province. It focuses on the 
2014 election campaign and the extent to which the negative campaign cycle 
evident in previous elections continued during the 2014 election campaign. 
INTRODUCTION
Election outcomes in the Western Cape have been examined through analyses 
of the ‘coloured vote’. Breytenbach (1999, p 117), for example, argued that the 
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coloured vote was of special significance ‘because the outcome of the Western 
Cape hinged very much on this factor’, while a decade later Butler (2009, p 81) 
noted that in the run-up to the 2009 election the African National Congress (ANC) 
leadership became alarmed about ‘the major realignment of Coloured voters in the 
province’. Coloured voters do form the majority of the provincial population in 
the Western Cape – in the 2011 census 49% of the people of the province described 
themselves as ‘coloured’. The Western Cape is also the only province where three 
different political parties (namely the New National Party – NNP, the ANC and 
the Democratic Alliance – DA) have held power. The reason for the alternation of 
power is said to lie with the coloured majority in the province (Africa 2010, p 1). 
These analyses provide a good starting point for understanding election 
outcomes in the province. As elsewhere in the country, race and other forms of 
identity remain important. South Africa remains a highly racialised society. Not 
only do historically defined ‘race’ groups in the Western Cape continue to be 
confronted with very different forms of persuasion and different information 
networks, they also have vastly different life experiences. In the democratic 
dispensation significant efforts have been made to uplift the lives of people 
impoverished by apartheid. However, life opportunities are still, to a large extent, 
racially structured. The province, therefore, provides a potent environment for 
race-based mobilisation and campaign efforts. 
Unfortunately these explanations also do not take us very far. Indeed Hoeane 
(2004) has provided a comprehensive critique of explanations premised on the 
racially-based motivations of coloured voters in the Western Cape. Hoeane (2004, 
p 148) asserts that
the historical reality that the coloured people in the province are not 
wedded to one political party indicates that to ascribe emotive and 
racialised explanations to the behaviour of ‘coloured voters’ in the 
Western Cape is to limit analysis. 
Not only, as Hoeane indicates, is this a very limited analysis, it is also a problematic 
one because it opens up the space for political parties to behave as they see fit 
in their attempts to attract voters. When the demographic characteristics of the 
electorate are regarded as the primary determinant of electoral strategy, political 
parties resort to attack politics and appeals to prejudice and stereotypes. This 
racially-based explanation of election outcomes has fed into the choices, rhetoric 
and behaviour of political parties (Africa 2010, p 2). 
Rather, the character of campaigns can best be understood through an 
examination of the interaction between the key electoral role players. According 
to Buchanan (2001, p 365), three sets of actors are critical to election campaigns 
– candidates, the media and voters. Buchanan argues that candidate incentives 
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(of electoral victory) combine with media incentives (the need for peer respect, 
novelty, immediacy and the pressure of sustaining or increasing readership 
figures) and with certain traits of the electorate (such as alienation and indifference) 
to invite and offer rationalisations for the use of manipulation and deception. 
According to Buchanan (2001, pp 366-370) the difficulties of motivating an often 
indifferent and inattentive public invite candidates to appeal to narrow self-
interest and to emotions like fear, prejudice and anger as well as ‘emotional appeals 
that covertly trigger racial resentment’. Media incentives evoke campaign coverage 
practices (such as a focus on the most dramatic and conflictual features of the 
campaign) and discourage extensive or detailed substantive coverage of policies. 
The mutually-reinforcing, symbiotic relationship between journalists and 
candidates drives journalists to produce ‘spectacle’ news: a genre requiring 
dramatic or entertaining stories with a focus on evaluating personalities 
rather than policy-making abilities. Buchanan (2001, p 368) further indicates 
that ‘aggressive campaign rhetoric, even when it conveys factual information 
potentially useful to voters, reinforces the well-documented public distaste for 
candidates, politics, parties and government’. Buchanan thus provides a useful 
model for understanding the campaign environment. Destructive patterns of 
engagement also manifest in a particular way between incumbent parties and 
opposition parties. Typically, incumbents defend their record, while the opposition 
challenges or attacks the record of the incumbent. This is a necessarily conflictual 
mode of engagement.   
To what extent has this destructive pattern of engagement been evident 
in election campaigning in the Western Cape? This article examines the 2014 
election campaign in the province and the extent to which the negative campaign 
cycle evident in previous elections continued in 2014. It will show that this has 
been the dominant mode of engagement and that it is exacerbated by attempts 
to capture the coloured vote. Since 1994 political parties have used race-based 
campaign strategies with varying degrees of success. Initially, the National Party 
(NP) achieved success by using racially inflammatory rhetoric to tap into the fears 
of voters in the Western Cape. This success was short lived because the events 
which unfolded after that victory contradicted the key message delivered by the 
NP because campaign messages on their own are not sufficient to persuade voters, 
they also interact with political developments which occur at both the provincial 
and national level. 
ELECTORAL TRENDS IN THE WESTERN CAPE SINCE 1994
Campaigning in the Western Cape has been characterised by aggressive appeals 
to race-based fears. In 1994 the ANC put a particularly aggressive spin on the 
nationally-run ‘attack, contrast and endorsement’ campaign, emphasising the 
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attack component of the campaign with a series of advertisements asserting that 
the National Party’s economic policy was responsible for the unemployment 
that had ‘struck at the heart of coloured, African and Indian communities in the 
Western Cape’ (Eldridge & Seekings 1995, p 15). Attention was paid to the NP’s 
past record of forced removals, corruption, involvement in ‘third force’ activities, 
covert operations it undertook, its backing from ‘Witdoek’ vigilante leaders and 
the fact that Hernus Kriel, the NP’s candidate for premier of the province was 
responsible for the notorious Section 29 law, which related to detention conditions 
(Eldridge & Seekings 1995, pp 15-16). 
The NP in its campaign also capitalised on the highly-racialised fears of 
voters in the province. The vast series of endorsement-type advertisements for the 
NP utilised images of terrorism, intimidation, burning of collaborators, boycotts 
and strike action, referring to ‘the comrades’ as being responsible for violence 
in the country. The negative depiction of the ANC as a violent and dangerous 
party that would plunge South Africa into a state of chaos was bolstered by 
events surrounding the squatter occupation of houses built for coloured people 
(Giliomee 1994, pp 66-67). 
The NP’s campaign messages about the ANC’s involvement in boycotts, 
strikes, arson and other acts of violence fell on fertile ground and convinced 
voters in the Western Cape that the ANC would allow the country to descend into 
anarchy. This tactic resulted in the NP winning an outright majority of 53.3% of 
the provincial vote ahead of the ANC’s 33%. In the 1994 election the Democratic 
Party (DP) hardly featured because the election had assumed the character of a 
presidential race between Nelson Mandela of the ANC and F W de Klerk of the 
NP (Welsh 1994, p 107). The DP only won 6.6% of the provincial vote. 
The 1999 election saw a realignment of politics in the province. The NNP lost 
its majority status, receiving only 38.4% of provincial votes despite having adopted 
a new name and a multiracial focus. The NNP manifesto for 1999 professed that 
the party was the most multiracial party in South Africa, representing ‘a broad and 
inclusive South African patriotism that transcends race, language and religion’ 
(New National Party 1999, p 213). The new focus also sat uncomfortably with 
the NNP’s emphasis on protecting minority rights and its decision to change its 
name signalled an admission that it had erred and needed to improve. 
The ANC in the province also took a softer approach, with appeals for voters 
simply to give it a chance. As Lodge (1999, p 66) indicates, particular emphasis 
was placed on ‘listening’. Party leaders concentrated on meetings with select 
groups of community and religious leaders, while branch members focused on 
household visits. The ANC’s campaign efforts might have helped it somewhat, 
however, the shift in power was largely due to the fact that voters in the Western 
Cape watched as ANC incumbents at national level led South Africa into a new 
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era under the leadership of international icon Nelson Mandela. The NNP, on the 
other hand, lost F W de Klerk as leader and was shamed by the flood of appalling 
revelations to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Breytenbach 1999, p 119). 
While both the NNP and the ANC softened their campaign approach in the 
1999 election the DP decided on a more aggressive strategy. Under the leadership 
of Tony Leon it built this strategy around ‘robust opposition’, with a focus on 
government failings, incompetence, corruption and a lack of urgency (Schrire 2001, 
p 142). According to Welsh (1999, p 91) the DP, in 1996, began to fashion a new 
approach to election campaigns, which involved the presentation of two clearly 
competing visions: the ANC’s collectivism and the DP’s democratic liberalism. 
This formed the basis of its ‘fight back’ campaign in the 1999 election. 
The DP doubled its share of the vote in the Western Cape to 12% and, in 
the end, a NNP/DP alliance kept the ANC out of power despite the fact that the 
ANC had won 42.1% cent of the vote. F W de Klerk’s successor, Marthinus van 
Schalkwyk, became the new premier of the Western Cape. The Democratic Party 
and New National Party announced in June 2000 that they would join up as the 
Democratic Alliance, with the aim of building a political movement that would 
effectively challenge the ANC for political power (Lodge 2002, p 157). The merger 
was short lived, with the NNP extricating itself from the new political formation 
in November 2001.  
In 2004 the inconsistencies in NNP rhetoric finalised the demise of the party. 
Its support base was decimated by its incongruent and internally inconsistent 
campaign messages as well as by organisational difficulties. By 2004 the NNP, 
in coalition with its former arch-enemy the ANC, preached a campaign message 
that completely contradicted its messages of 1994 and 1999. On the other hand, 
the ANC ran a largely positive campaign, celebrating ten years of democracy. It 
emphasised its achievements, acknowledged its shortcomings and drew attention 
to its strength, experience and commitment. 
The main thrust of the ANC’s 2004 campaign was that it was the only 
legitimate party able to improve the lives of ordinary South Africans. A key 
message related to its partnership with ‘the people’ in pursuing this goal. The 
theme of ‘a better life for all’ and the presentation of the role of the ANC in 
ending apartheid as well as the importance of contracts and partnerships with 
various social actors was consistent with previous campaigns. As Lodge (2005, 
p 117) indicates, the language used also revived the ‘people-centred’ rhetoric of 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme. In 2004 the ANC focused on 
presenting itself as competent in its role as the government of the day. The message 
that ‘the tide has turned’ became institutionalised, indicating to voters that the 
ANC-led government had been successful in ushering in change in South Africa 
(Booysen 2005, p 131). 
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The ANC won 45.3% of the vote in 2004 and took control of the provincial 
government in the Western Cape under the premiership of Ebrahim Rasool. 
Meanwhile, the DA’s support base in the Western Cape climbed to 27.1%. The DA 
contended that a vote for the NNP in 2004 was as good as a vote for the ANC. It 
contrasted itself with the ANC and with other opposition parties, communicating 
the message to voters that other parties lacked sound policies, competence and 
integrity or that they simply served to fracture the opposition. 
The primary theme of the DA’s 2004 campaign was ‘South Africa deserves 
better’. The party’s campaign style was marginally softer than it had been during 
the 1999 ‘Fight Back’ campaign. However, the ambiguous subtext of slogans such 
as ‘Vote DA for real change’ raised questions about whether the change from 
apartheid to democracy was artificial. As Booysen (2005) argues, the slogans 
were interpreted ‘as being polarizing’. Edigheji (2004) went as far as saying that 
the DA had predicated its election campaign on ‘fear-mongering’ and ‘alarmism’. 
In 2009, with the NNP absorbed into the ANC, the contest in the Western 
Cape was between the DA and the ANC. The DA’s campaign, consistent with 
its previous hard-hitting messages, took place in a completely different political 
context. National events between 2004 and 2009 had created a situation in which 
the party’s messages were much more salient to voters in the Western Cape. These 
events included the protracted and well-publicised corruption trial of Schabir 
Shaik, a close associate of then Deputy President Jacob Zuma.  Shaik was found 
guilty and the basis of the conviction hinged on payments he had made to Zuma. 
Following this conviction then president Thabo Mbeki relieved Zuma of his role 
as deputy president, installing Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka as the new deputy 
president of South Africa.
Mbeki decided to stand for a third term as president of the ANC although 
he could not be president of South Africa since there is a two-term presidential 
limit. Jacob Zuma, no longer deputy president of South Africa, stood for election 
as ANC president. The decision about who would lead the ANC would be made 
at the party’s 52nd national conference. The ANC ‘entered a spiral of contestation 
between Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki centring on issues of succession and 
incumbency’ (Booysen 2009, p 90). Zuma achieved victory at the national 
conference in Polokwane, obtaining the vote of 60% of the delegates (Southall 
2009, p 4). This resulted in a situation where Mbeki was president of South Africa 
while Zuma was president of the ANC. 
In September 2008, a little more than six months before the 2009 general 
elections, Judge Chris Nicholson delivered a high court judgement which inferred 
that Mbeki and senior members of his Cabinet had interfered with the work of 
the National Prosecuting Authority with regard to a decision to prosecute Zuma 
(Jolobe 2009, p 139) on multiple counts of fraud. The judgement provided the basis 
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for a vote of no confidence in Mbeki. Following Mbeki’s televised resignation 
as the president of South Africa, ANC deputy president Kgalema Motlanthe 
became South Africa’s acting president. As Butler (2009, p 69) points out, the 
unprecedented defeat of an incumbent ANC president was followed by a wave 
of instability, during which officeholders were ‘recalled’ and perceived Mbeki 
loyalists purged.   
These national political developments had a very damaging effect on 
perceptions of President Zuma and the ANC among voters in the Western 
Cape. An Afrobarometer survey conducted in late 2008 revealed that only 13% 
of respondents in the province said they trusted Zuma ‘always’ or ‘most of the 
time’ (Africa 2010, p 19). 
The events also led to the resignation of several ANC members and the 
formation of the Congress of the People (Cope) under the leadership of Mosiuoa 
Lekota and Mbhazima Shilowa. In addition, ANC structures in the Western Cape 
were beset with their own problems. Even before the formation of Cope in 2008 
there were reports of internal battles between factions aligned to former premier 
Ebrahim Rasool and then provincial secretary Mcebisi Skwatsha (News24, 2005). 
Months after Mbeki was recalled as president of the country Rasool was told to 
resign as premier and was replaced by then Finance Member of the Executive 
Council (MEC) Lynne Brown (Makinana & Williams 2008). 
In 2009 the Western Cape ANC campaign mirrored the party’s national 
campaign, which focused on putting Jacob Zuma into power as South Africa’s 
president. The theme was ‘Working together, we can do more’.  However, these 
efforts were completely overshadowed by the national events outlined above. 
Meanwhile, the DA ran its ‘One Nation One Future’ campaign under the new 
leadership of Helen Zille, former mayor of the City of Cape Town. Its message 
could be summarised by the slogans of two campaign posters: ‘Vote to win’ and 
‘Stop Zuma’ (Daniel & Southall 2009, p 237). Messages about the challenges to 
democracy posed by a Zuma-led government and ANC dominance now resonated 
with voters in the Western Cape and the DA received an outright majority, securing 
51.4% of the provincial vote. The ANC’s portion of the vote declined to 32%.
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2009
After the DA seized control from the ANC in the 2009 elections governance in the 
province became highly conflictual and relations between the DA and the ANC in 
the Western Cape reached new levels of dysfunctional competitiveness. Besides 
policy differences and the usual vigour with which incumbent and opposition 
parties engage each other, a toxic level of acrimony and hostility has permeated 
exchanges between the two parties. 
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The fact that the ANC’s provincial power was usurped by the DA in 2009, 
combined with racially structured inequality in the Western Cape, has provided a 
fertile ground for mobilisation and protest action. While thriving in many respects, 
the Western Cape has many inter-related complex developmental challenges. 
Many areas are regarded as major international tourist attractions, Cape Town won 
the 2014 World Design Capital title and the City of Cape Town has been rolling 
out its MyCiti bus service, with many new routes and bus services introduced 
into the city and surrounding areas. 
Yet inequality is a major problem in the province. Irrespective of claims and 
counter-claims about which city in South Africa is the most unequal, the fact is 
that people living in township areas of the Western Cape face many socioeconomic 
challenges, including a shortage of adequate housing and backlogs in the provision 
of basic services. Apartheid-era spatial planning fuels many of these problems 
(Wainwright 2014).  
The province has been plagued by service-delivery protests. In 2012 farm 
workers embarked on protest action for higher wages and improved working 
conditions. The violence that erupted in many farming towns resulted in the 
loss of lives (Underhill 2013). Following the farm worker protests, dissatisfaction 
in the townships of Gugulethu, Khayelitsha and Nyanga gave rise to what was 
termed the ‘poo protests’, in which protestors threw faeces on the stairs of the 
provincial legislature of the Western Cape and later at Cape Town international 
airport (Davis 2012).  
Thousands of people took to the streets marching through the Cape 
Town city centre, damaging many businesses. Leaders of the landless 
people’s movement argued that protests seem to be the only way to 
get the leadership of the province to pay attention, because ‘once in 
power they turn against the voters’. 
Smook 2009 
The ‘poo protestors’ held several protests during which national roads had to be 
closed (Williams 2014). 
The ANC in the province has accused the DA of being uncaring, inaccessible 
and unresponsive to the poor, highlighting, in particular, the disparity between 
rich and poor (Fransman 2014). The DA, in turn, accused the ANC of trying 
to destabilise the province and sabotage its governance efforts. The DA was 
convinced during the farmworkers’ protest that the ANC was deliberately 
stimulating anger in order to push its political agenda (Davis 2012). It also blamed 
the ANC for fuelling protest action, while the ANC blamed the DA for not dealing 
adequately with the socioeconomic issues faced by township residents. 
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Given the scale of violence in the province, a number of religious groups 
and civil society organisations in the Western Cape released a declaration on 
26 November 2013 signed by well-known religious leaders such as Archbishop 
Emeritus Desmond Tutu and the current Archbishop of Cape Town, Thabo 
Makgoba, as well as by many religious academics. The declaration called for the 
faith community to take the lead in restoring the democratic values being denied 
‘by political leaders who are trying to make the Western Cape ungovernable’ 
(Independent Online 2013a).  The political environment in the province became 
toxic between 2009 and 2014 and the Western Cape has been marked by 
extraordinary levels of distrust and political tension. This volatile situation led the 
Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC)’s Western Cape provincial electoral 
officer, Courtney Sampson, to say that ‘the climate of desperation in some areas 
could be a threat to election proceedings’ (Geach 2014a). 
The ANC faced continued challenges in the run-up to the 2011 local 
government elections. ANC offices in Cape Town were stormed by protestors 
angry about the list process (Independent Online 2013b) and former ANC Deputy 
President Kgalema Motlanthe admitted that internal upheavals had caused the 
party to lose 40 wards in the Western Cape (Mtyala 2011). The fallout from the 2011 
elections continued well after they were concluded. An internal ANC task team 
investigating allegations of irregularities in the list process looked at 10 wards 
in Cape Town and three in the Overberg and found that the processes leading to 
the nominations of Mzwakhe Nqavashe from Ward 40 and Coetzee Ntotoviyane 
from Ward 42, both in Gugulethu, had been flawed and recommended that the 
party begin the processes afresh (Coetzee 2013). In another incident, Western 
Cape ANC provincial chairperson Marius Fransman had to be rescued by his 
bodyguards after being attacked in Oudtshoorn following a meeting to replace 
the town’s mayor, Gordon April (Barnes 2013). 
The 2014 list process also presented significant challenges. The final list 
included Mbulelo Ncedana and Moegamat Majiet, both of whom had left the 
ANC to join Cope when it was formed (Hartley 2014). 
While many voters in the Western Cape might not have been aware of the 
trials facing the ANC in the province, they would most likely have followed 
national events, which also created a challenging environment for the country’s 
ruling party. Most notably, there has been sustained controversy and a significant 
public uproar about the Public Protector’s findings regarding the inappropriate 
use of funds to upgrade President Jacob Zuma’s private residence in Nkandla in 
KwaZulu-Natal. 
Events such as the televised death of community activist Andries Tatane in 
2011 at the hands of police in the Free State and the lethal use of force in August 
2012 that resulted in the deaths of 34 Lonmin mineworkers, shot and killed by 
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police officers in what has become known as the ‘Marikana Massacre’ highlighted 
issues of community frustration and police brutality. In addition, civil society 
organisation Right2Know led a highly visible campaign against the Protection 
of State Information Bill (popularly known as the ‘secrecy bill’), while rights 
organisation Section 27 highlighted inefficiencies in the public school system, 
particularly the non-delivery of textbooks in Limpopo (Africa 2014b). 
The ANC also came in for increased criticism from its own supporters and, 
indeed, from former party leaders. The dissatisfaction was so pronounced that 
former Intelligence Minister, Ronnie Kasrils, among others, embarked on the 
‘Sidikiwe, Vukane, We are fed up’ campaign, urging voters either to spoil their 
votes or to vote for one of the smaller parties.  
The party also faced criticism from the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (Cosatu) over the rollout of highway tolling fees in Gauteng and over 
sections of the National Development Plan. The National Union of Metalworkers 
of SA (Numsa) strongly criticised the ANC and President Zuma and decided not 
to endorse the ruling party in the 2014 election (Africa 2014b). 
The DA, on the other hand, consolidated its Western Cape support base 
in the 2011 local government elections. The party received a boost when the 
Independent Democrats (ID), formed by Patricia de Lille, originally of the Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC), was absorbed by the DA prior to the 2011 elections. The 
ID had managed to win three seats in the 2004 and 2009 Western Cape provincial 
elections. In 2010 the party signed an agreement that would see it merge with 
the DA (Jolobe 2014, p 137). Patricia de Lille was invited into the Western Cape 
DA provincial cabinet and was later elected DA mayor of the City of Cape Town 
(Jolobe 2014, p 138).
While DA parliamentary leader Lindiwe Mazibuko and the party’s Gauteng 
premier candidate, Mmusi Maimane, managed to achieve national profiles that 
enhanced the party’s credibility, the DA’s main challenge has been to shed its 
image as a party concerned only with ‘elite interests’ and to adopt a coherent 
position on its stance on affirmative action. Party leader and Western Cape Premier 
Helen Zille was forced to apologise for confusion about the party’s position on 
employment equity (Williams 2014). While the ill-fated deal struck with Agang 
SA, in which Agang leader Mamphela Ramphele agreed to become the DA’s 
‘presidential candidate’, earned Helen Zille some harsh criticism, the party’s 
leaders managed the fallout by presenting a united front at a press conference 
held to explain the failed merger.  
THE 2014 ELECTION CAMPAIGN 
A total of 26 provinces contested at provincial level in the 2014 elections in the 
Western Cape, making it the most competitive province. As outlined above, the 
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2014 campaign took place in the context of deep-seated disillusionment in many 
communities. Furthermore, the fact that the DA had won the 2009 election by a 
very narrow margin made the contest particularly fierce. Political parties saw the 
Western Cape as an ‘open race’ and the province became the centre of vigorous 
campaign efforts in the lead-up to the election. 
Most political parties supplemented their national campaign plans with 
strategies specifically aimed at reaching voters in the province. Parties targeted 
particular groups such as farming and fishing communities as well as areas 
affected by gang violence. Posters belonging to the DA, ANC, EFF, Agang SA, 
Cope, the Patriotic Alliance (PA), the National Freedom Party (NFP) the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP), the United Democratic Movement (UDM) and the Freedom 
Front Plus (FF+) lined the streets in the suburbs of the Cape Metro and other 
towns in the province. Door-to-door campaigning and large public gatherings 
featured prominently. 
The African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) held its official campaign 
launch at the beginning of March (Norton 2014) and hosted various meetings 
across the Western Cape. The party’s president, Kenneth Meshoe, went on a 
five-day walkabout in the province, meeting with churches, communities and 
businesses. The ACDP also deployed members of Parliament Cheryllen Dudley 
and Steve Swart, as well as a member of the provincial legislature, Grant Haskin 
and councillors Ferlon Christians, Demi Dudley and Gerald Siljeur in the province 
to meet with communities, walk the streets and address churches (ACDP 2014). 
The EFF engaged in some novel forms of campaigning, among them 
hosting a ‘Western Cape Social Revolution Party’ at a Long Street, Cape Town, 
club (EFF 2014). In January the party’s leader, Julius Malema, gave an address 
at Khayelitsha’s Mew Way hall (Damba 2014) and the party’s official campaign 
launch was held in Delft on 15 March. Malema also visited the West Coast, the 
Overberg and Mitchells Plain (Coetzee 2014). 
The ANC invested a significant amount of time and energy on its campaign 
efforts in the Western Cape. As early as October 2013 it sent two of its senior 
members to strengthen its volunteer campaign, with Public Enterprises Minister 
Malusi Gigaba and Home Affairs Minister Naledi Pandor going to Khayelithsa to 
engage with ANC door-to-door election campaign volunteers (Kobokana 2013). 
The ANC’s Western Cape manifesto launch was held on 18 January at Delft 
stadium, with deputy secretary general Jessie Duarte as the main speaker (ANC 
2014). One newspaper article noted that the ANC was ‘pulling out all the stops 
to win back the Western Cape’. In fact, President Zuma spent his 72nd birthday 
in a Cape Flats community, holding a rally at Vygieskraal Stadium, Athlone, as 
part of his birthday celebrations (Phakathi 2014a). 
Members of the ANC’s Women’s League and of the provincial executive 
committee engaged ‘with South Africans across the Western Cape as part of their 
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non-stop election campaign’, embarking on door-to-door activities and listening 
to the concerns of community members (ANC 2014). 
In addition, former Western Cape premier and current South African 
ambassador to the US, Ebrahim Rasool, went on a ‘whistle stop’ tour of Cape 
Town in a bid to convince the middle-class electorate, especially Muslims, to 
vote for the ANC (Kemp 2014). Provincial ANC leader Marius Fransman was 
also particularly active in his campaign efforts. During his campaign tour of the 
Cape farmlands and the West Coast, he addressed farmworkers at a rally near 
De Doorns on 22 April, lashing out at the DA and accusing it of siding with farm 
owners instead of workers (Geach 2014b). 
The ANC’s campaign centred on the 20th anniversary of democracy in South 
Africa.  The party’s theme for 2014 was that it had ‘a good story to tell’, a message 
that was introduced in President Zuma’s pre-election State of the Nation address 
and was the golden thread woven through all the party’s election campaign 
messages. A key theme emerging from the ANC’s campaign in the Western Cape 
was that the people of the province needed to be rescued from the DA’s racist 
governance. Gigaba criticised the DA’s policies on land, saying the party ‘wanted 
land to remain in the hands of a white minority’ (Etheridge 2014) and Fransman 
told farmworkers at a rally near De Doorns that ‘apartheid still reigned in the 
Cape farmlands’ (Geach 2014b). 
On 19 March Gigaba is reported to have told Cape Town residents at a packed 
meeting in the O R Tambo Hall in Khayelitsha that the DA ‘are not the devil’s 
brothers. They are not the devil’s relatives. They are the devils themselves. And 
so our modern-day devils, two-legged as they are, are liars and cannot face the 
truth’ (Etheridge 2014). Meanwhile, Sports Minister Fikile Mbalula compared 
the DA’s governance in the Western Cape to witchcraft and urged residents to 
summon the help of tokoloshes. Speaking in Nyanga on the occasion of the 35th 
anniversary of the death of Solomon Mahlangu, an ANC operative who had been 
sentenced to death for murder during the apartheid era, he said:
this thing of witchcraft is when a witch does nothing for the people 
but they still get re-elected. This is what we find ourselves in here in 
the Western Cape. We are being governed by witches … these witches 
are oppressing us, they are trampling on us. Where are the tokoloshes 
and the [sangomas] so that we can chase these witches away? 
Koyana 2014
Linked to the theme of saving the Western Cape from racist governance were 
campaign appeals designed to attract the coloured vote. President Zuma told 
supporters at his birthday celebrations that
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the Western Cape needs a government that will treat the people 
of the Western Cape equally. Enough is enough with the neglect of 
predominantly African and Coloured areas in this province … There’s 
nothing to fear. The ANC is your family. 
Cronje & Van Schie 2014
Some leaders chastised voters in the province. After a two-day visit to the Cape 
Flats Gwede Mantashe said coloured people would remain a minority if they did 
not define themselves properly. He reportedly said:
You call yourself a minority. You are governed by a minority all the 
time. It’s a mindset. We must liberate ourselves ... and appreciate 
you are part of a majority … One thing we are not going to do is give 
coloureds presents. Coloured people must play their role and earn 
their responsibilities. They must earn it among all of us.
News24, 2014a
The ANC’s call for the support of ‘smaller political parties’ to win back the DA-led 
province was shunned, with Cope leader Mosiuoa Lekota saying that his party 
had formed coalitions with the DA in the Western and Northern Cape because 
of the ‘strong position taken by both parties to deal decisively with rampant 
corruption and maladministration’ (Coetzee 2014). 
The DA ran a highly visible national campaign complemented by strategies 
specifically aimed at reaching particular groups such as farming and fishing 
communities as well as areas affected by gang violence. Many of the ANC’s 
problems (the Public Protector’s report on Nkandla and the textbook crises in 
Limpopo in particular) provided the party with rallying points for its ‘Western 
Cape Story’ campaign, which was launched on 8 March at Blue Downs Stadium 
in Cape Town (DA 2014c) at a rally attended by about 4 000 people wearing blue 
T-shirts emblazoned with the DA logo (Geldenhuys 2014). According to the DA, 
the Western Cape story ‘highlighted the great strides made in the province since 
2009’ (Democratic Alliance 2014b). 
Much of the DA’s strategy was focused on refuting the ANC’s ‘good story’ 
message while simultaneously highlighting the party’s achievements in the 
Western Cape. While delivering her State of the Province address, Helen Zille 
asserted that ‘we have the best story to tell’ (Makinana 2014). The party’s campaign 
slogan was ‘Together for change, Together for jobs’ (Democratic Alliance 2014a). 
On 26 March Zille launched the DA Braille Manifesto at the League of the 
Friends of the Blind in Grassypark, in an effort to attract support from voters with 
disabilities (Democratic Alliance 2014d). On 6 April she led a march in Mitchells 
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Plain against gang violence and drug abuse, to highlight efforts of the DA-led City 
of Cape Town municipality to combat these social ills (Sesant 2014). The march 
also served to launch billboard messages showing Mayor Patricia de Lille and 
other prominent Capetonians promoting the campaign to combat gang violence 
and drug abuse, as issues that continue to affect communities in the Cape Flats. 
Two weeks later, on 19 April, Zille again addressed an anti-drugs and 
gangsterism march in Manenberg (News24, 2014b). DA Western Cape leader 
Ivan Meyer and party provincial deputy Theuns Botha hosted an election rally 
in Hartenbos, close to George, on 12 April to get the DA message across and to 
consolidate party support that had been tested in the area in recent by-elections 
(Phakathi 2014b). On 17 April Zille delivered a speech at a small harbours picket 
in Hout Bay, where she addressed fishing communities in an effort to allay fresh 
fears that proposed government policies on the allocation of fishing quotas would 
negatively affect the livelihoods of many in the fishing communities (Democratic 
Alliance 2014c). 
The DA issued a pamphlet specifically aimed at coloured voters and quoting 
former ANC Director General of Labour, Jimmy Manyi, who, in 2010 had said that 
there was an over-supply and an over-concentration of coloured people in the 
Western Cape. The DA pamphlet, captioned ‘The ANC wants to stop you from 
getting a job, or a promotion’, indicated that the ANC had issued new employment 
regulations which would ‘prevent thousands of Coloured people in the Western 
Cape from getting jobs’ (DA 2014c).
Under the draft employment equity legislation companies with more than 
150 employees would have to use the national economically active population 
demographics to determine the equity targets of their top and senior management 
as well as their professionally qualified staff. The DA argued that this would clash 
with provincial racial demographics and marginalise certain race groups from 
the workforce in the Western Cape (Watters 2014). 
In reaction to this, lawyers for the ANC in the Western Cape sent a letter to 
Helen Zille demanding a retraction of the pamphlet, arguing that it constituted 
a violation of the Electoral Act and the Electoral Code of Conduct and that it was 
‘clearly geared to divide communities on racial lines, and cause serious discontent 
amongst voters and possible voters’ (Mjongile 2014)
The ANC also strongly criticised the DA’s ‘Western Cape story’, arguing 
that Zille had not kept her promises and had not delivered to poor communities. 
For example, ANC Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa accused her of neglecting 
delivery in the province, saying that ‘wherever we go, they [people in the Western 
Cape] are crying tears because of poor service’ (SAPA 2014). The ANC felt that 
it had done sufficient to regain control of the province, especially in the light of 
deep-seated disillusionment in many communities and the violent protests which 
had taken place prior to the elections.
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The DA also ran an aggressive campaign against smaller parties, distributing 
pamphlets and running a series of radio advertisements pointing out that a vote 
for any opposition party other than the DA, was a ‘wasted’ vote. In one pamphlet 
the party used a graph to point out that it had won the Western Cape by a mere 
1.5% of the vote and that a vote for a small party could result in an ANC-led 
coalition taking back the Western Cape. It further pointed out that abstaining 
could benefit the ANC. 
VOTER TURNOUT 
Despite the perpetual mudslinging between parties there was an increase in voter 
turnout and the 2014 election in the Western Cape was more competitive than that 
in 2009. As seen in Table 1 a large proportion of eligible citizens in the province 
registered to vote. When the voters’ roll was certified in March 2014 by the IEC 
2.9-million of 3.8-million eligible voters had registered – a registration level of 78% 
(IEC 2014a).  On election day 2.1-million people (73% of registered voters in the 
Western Cape) cast their ballot. While this represents a slight decline in turnout 
from the 75% in 2009, participation as a proportion of the eligible voting-age 
population increased slightly from 53% in 2009 to 57%. There was a negligible 
proportion of spoilt ballots (0.88%).
Table 1

















1994 2 405919 NA NA 2 137 742 88.85 NA
1999 2 317 171 1 864 019 80.44% 1 587978 68.53 85.19
2004 3 024 207 2 220 283 73.41% 1 582 503 52.32 71.27
2009 3 746 547 2 634 439 70.31% 1 987 777 53.05 75.45
2014 3 771 271 2 941 333 77.99% 2 140 090 56.74 72.76
Sources:  Africa 2014a; www.electionupdate.org.za; IEC 2014 
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RESULTS 
The Democratic Alliance emerged from the elections significantly strengthened. 
The party increased its majority in the Western Cape, winning 59% of the vote in 
2014 compared to 51% in 2009 (see table 2). The DA remained the ruling party in 
the provincial legislature, holding 26 of the 42 seats, up from their previous term 
when they had occupied 22 seats.
The ANC maintained its level of support in the Western Cape, with 33% of 
voters casting their ballot for the party compared to 32% in 2009. The ANC thus 
maintained the 14 seats it had won in 2009. 
Table 2
Western Cape Provincial Results (1994-2014)
Party Total number of votes
1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
DP/DA   141 970
7%
  189 183
 12%
  424 832
27%




ANC   705 576
33%
  668 106
42%
  709 052
45%














FF/FF+   44 003
2%
  6 394
0.40%
  9 705
0.62%




ACDP   25 731
1%
  44 323
3%
  53 934
3%








  122 867
8%






  38 071
2%
  27 489
1,75%














NP/NNP   1 138 242   609 612   170 469 NA NA
53% 38% 11% NA
Source: IEC 2014 
This consolidation of DA support thus came primarily at the expense of smaller 
parties in the province. There was a sharp decline in support for Cope, which lost 
the three seats it had won in the Western Cape legislature in 2009.  Its support 
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in the province declined from 8% in 2009 to 0.6% in 2014 following a damaging 
public battle for the leadership of the party. The ACDP’s support base also 
dropped – from 2% in 2009 to 1% in 2014. This secured the party only one seat in 
the provincial legislature, down from the two seats it held after the 2009 election. 
The EFF managed to win only 2% of the vote in the province, securing one seat 
in the provincial legislature. 
As seen in Table 3, other small parties in the Western Cape received negligible 
support in the 2014 election. Parties such as Agang SA and the Patriotic Alliance 
(PA) did not feature at all. Agang SA won 0.3% while the PA won 0.4%. 
It would appear that the DA’s campaign against smaller parties, evident since 
2004, yielded results in 2014. The growth of the DA in the Western Cape must 
also be seen in the context of the NNP’s demise and the growing set of challenges 
that has faced the ANC since 2007. The DA also ran a campaign as the provincial 
incumbent, with the message that it ‘had the best story to tell’. This simultaneously 
highlighted its record of governance in the province and its criticism of the ANC 
nationally and in other provinces. In terms of the final election result, the DA 
was not punished at the polls for the use of race-based campaign rhetoric such 
as publishing the pamphlet criticising employment equity legislation and the 
comments made by Jimmy Manyi in 2010.
The ANC, however, seems to have paid a price for resorting to identity 
politics. Once it was ousted from power the party became far more confrontational 
in its approach. In stark contrast to its 1999 and 2004 campaigns, it chastised 
Western Cape voters and implored them to liberate the province from ‘racist 
governance’. While this may have mobilised its core supporters, the strategy 
proved counterproductive in that it probably alienated middle-ground voters 
across the spectrum, working to the advantage of the DA. 
Further research would be needed to assess whether the DA’s strengthened 
position is primarily an anti-ANC/EFF vote or is the result of growing loyalty to 
the DA, positive perceptions of the party’s performance or strategic voting based 
on the premise that it is better to vote for a party that does not face the same 
capacity constraints as other opposition parties. Some voters might have felt that 
they needed to counter the electoral dominance of the ANC or they may have 
been concerned about the extent of support for Julius Malema’s newly-formed 
party, the EFF. Thus, the radical platform upon which the EFF contested might 
have galvanised DA supporters even though most of the DA’s campaign efforts 
were directed against the ANC. 
There does appear to be growing loyalty to the DA in the province. Data 
from an Afrobarometer survey conducted in 2011 shows an increase in party 
identification among voters in the Western Cape from 48% in 2008 to 61% in 2011. 
Of the 61% who indicated that they felt close to a political party 49% said they felt 
close to the ANC and 45% said they felt close to the DA (Afrobarometer 2014). 
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Given the DA’s victory in the province, it would appear that a proportion of the 
electorate are voting for the party although they do not ‘feel close’ to it. Irrespective 
of whether the changes that have occurred were due to voters switching allegiance 
or to differential turnout, the outcome has been dramatic.




African Christian Democratic Party 21 696 1.02%
African Independent Congress 6 508 0.31%
African National Congress 697 664 32.89%
African National Party 1 249 0.06%
African People’s Convention 1 291 0.06%
Agang South Africa 6 398 0.30%
Al Jama-Ah 13 182 0.62%
Azanian People’s Organisation 844 0.04%
Congress  Of The People 12 520 0.59%
Democratic Alliance 1 259 645 59.38%
Economic Freedom Fighters 44 762 2.11%
First Nation Liberation Alliance 635 0.03%
Independent Civic Organisation Of South Africa 11 949 0.56%
Indigenous Peoples Organisation 1 180 0.06%
Inkatha Freedom Party 1 078 0.05%
Kingdom Governance Movement 490 0.02%
National Freedom Party 763 0.04%
National Party South Africa 2 694 0.13%
Pan Africanist Congress Of Azania 3 591 0.17%
Patriotic Alliance 8 510 0.40%
Peoples Alliance 440 0.02%
Sibanye Civic Association 478 0.02%
South African Progressive Civic Organisation 642 0.03%
United Christian Democratic Party 1 158 0.05%
United Democratic Movement 10 199 0.48%
Vryheidsfront Plus 11 587 0.55%
Total Valid Votes 2 121 153 100.00%
Spoilt Votes 18 937
Total Votes Cast 2 140 090
Table 3
Western Cape Provincial Results
Source: Independent Electoral Commission. 
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CONCLUSION: REPRODUCING DESTRUCTIVE PATTERNS OF 
ENGAGEMENT IN THE WESTERN CAPE
The campaign in the Western Cape once again degenerated into a series of negative 
race-based appeals, with politicians and political parties discrediting one another. 
All the parties that contested the election in the Western Cape signed the 2014 
electoral code of conduct indicating their agreement that ‘elections require an 
environment wherein there is free political activity, where all political parties 
are able to canvass support without fear or hindrance’ (IEC 2014c). However, 
as the election date draws closer parties find it hard to refrain from engaging 
in inflammatory campaign rhetoric (Africa 2014a). In 2014 parties accused each 
other of racial mobilisation and denied that they were practising it, even as they 
went ahead and engaged in inflammatory campaign rhetoric. 
 As indicated above these destructive campaign tactics are based 
on explanations which view voter choices as primarily determined by the 
characteristics of the voter. In addition to having a polarising effect, race-based 
strategies are quite simply ineffective if they do not resonate with public sentiment 
about provincial and national political developments. Yet the past five democratic 
elections in the province have reproduced a similar toxic campaign environment. 
 The work of Buchanan (see Figure 1) helps in unravelling the reasons why 
campaigning in the Western Cape assumes the same toxic patterns of engagement. 
Figure 1
Destructive Campaign Cycle







dealing with deadline 
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in negative campaigning, 
attack politics, appeals to 
emotions like fear, prejudice 
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Parties in the role of opposition typically resort to negative campaign appeals 
couched in racial terms. This is compounded by the way in which the media 
frames news stories about the ‘coloured’ vote as well as its preoccupation with 
conflict and hostility between parties and party leaders. While these conflicts 
may be newsworthy, in many instances such reporting contributes to negative 
campaign strategies used by parties in an attempt to secure media attention. 
It is for this reason that Africa (2010, p 1) argues that it is not primarily the 
nature of the electorate but political developments (both national and provincial) 
as well as the behaviour and campaign efforts of political parties that provide 
a more plausible reason for the dramatic political changes in the Western Cape. 
As Swanson & Mancini (1996, p 1) argue, politics is ‘always persuasive, 
forcing us consciously or subconsciously to interpret, to evaluate and to act’. Such 
persuasion inherently involves agency on the part of the recipients, who must 
assimilate and consider the information being presented to them. This leads to 
the question of what voters are interpreting and evaluating. They are, of course, 
interpreting and evaluating the words and actions of political parties and leaders. 
Despite the obvious limitations of identity-based politics, as well as its damaging 
effects, it is hard to see how this narrative will change in future elections.
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